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Abstract 
This paper uses mean and quantile regression analysis to investigate the gender pay gap for the 
wage employed in Vietnam over the period 1993 to 2002. It finds that the Doi moi reforms 
appear to have been associated with a sharp reduction in gender pay gap disparities for the 
wage employed. The average gender pay gap in this sector halved between 1993 and 2002 with 
most of the contraction evident by 1998. There has also been a narrowing in the gender pay gap 
at most selected points of the conditional wage distribution, an effect most pronounced at the 
top end of the conditional wage distribution. However, the decomposition analysis suggests that 
the treatment effect is relatively stable across the conditional wage distribution and little 
evidence of a ‘glass-ceiling’ effect is detected for Vietnamese women in the wage employment 
sector in any of the years examined.  
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1. Introduction 
Vietnam’s economic restructuring process, commonly known as Doi moi, has proved relatively 
successful for Vietnam placing it among the top economic performers in the developing world 
(Glewwe, Agrawal, and Dollar, 2004). The Vietnamese economy has grown at an average 
annual rate of over seven percent over the period 1990 to 2004, and the incidence of poverty has 
more than halved over this same period.1 The process of economic transition from a centrally 
planned to a market-based economy impacted on the labour market in Vietnam across a number 
of different dimensions (see Croll, 1998; Brassard, 2004; World Bank, 2005). For instance, the 
dismantling of a centrally determined wage system, which in the past limited the degree of 
gender wage inequality, created potential for a widening of the gender pay gap. The reform 
process, as in other transitional economies, led to a reduction in a variety of public services that 
more adversely affected female then male labour market participants. For example, enterprise 
kindergartens, schools and other health-care facilities, which were relatively commonplace 
under the centrally planned system, have steadily disappeared with the increased emphasis on 
market reform (Long, Le, Truitt, Mai, and Dang, 2000).  
The creation of a private sector labour market ended the dependence on the state sector as the 
primary source of formal employment. As of 2004, the share in employment of the state sector 
(including the administration system and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)) reduced to roughly 
ten percent of total employment, while formal private sector enterprises and household non-
farm businesses provided jobs for nearly 42% of the employed labour force (World Bank, 
2005). However, female workers were found to be more vulnerable in the restructuring of the 
state-owned enterprise sector. The reduction in the number of SOEs from more than 12,000 to 
around 5,500 in the first ten years of the reform process displaced large numbers of workers. 
Women with limited work experience and low educational attainment were the main victims of 
the early redundancy programmes with about 70% of laid-off workers being female (Rama, 
2001). Beresford (1994) reveals that over half-a-million female workers were made redundant 
from SOEs in 1990/1. Liu (2004b) suggests that the downsizing in the SOE sector provided a 
potential channel through which the gender pay gap could widen given that workers were more 
formally protected in the SOEs than in the private sector.  
Vietnamese women are currently accorded a wide range of rights and privileges at work under 
the Vietnam Labour Code.  Maternity leave is fully paid and time-off during either pregnancy or 
                                               
1 The average growth rate over the period 1990 to 2004 was 7.3% (own calculations from GSO statistics), while the 
proportion of people with a per capita consumption expenditure below the nationally defined poverty line reduced 
dramatically from 58 percent in 1993 to 29 percent in 2002 (World Bank, 2005). 
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when nursing a child aged less than twelve months is also regulated (see Chapter X of the 2002 
Labour Code (SRV, 2002).  Female employees are generally exempt from the unilateral 
termination of their contracts during this period (Article 27 of the Labour Code). As enterprises 
now possess greater autonomy in managing their business activities, including the management 
of human resources, there may be a tendency for employers to favour male workers (Brassard, 
2004) and this may result in a worsening relative position of women in the labour market.  
In contrast to these potentially more negative impacts of the Doi moi reforms on the female 
position in the labour market, there are also improvements evident in terms of new employment 
opportunities for women. The impressive growth over the past fifteen years has been partly 
driven by light manufacturing exports, a sector dominated by female workers. For instance, the 
exports of the garment industry accounted for almost a quarter of total manufacturing exports 
over the past 15 years (GSO, 2005). This sector is one of the major employment sources for 
female workers, including rural female migrants (Thornburn and Jones, 2002; Thornburn, 
Nguyen and Nguyen, 2002). Although the proportion of agricultural exports has steadily 
decreased over time, agricultural products still remain a major export commodity. The fact that 
women are more dependent on agricultural employment than men may suggest that the growth 
in agricultural exports has resulted in more income-generating activities for women.   
Given the foregoing, it is uncertain whether women have been gainers or losers during 
Vietnam’s transition process.  The experience in other transitional economies tends to suggest a 
mixed picture. The reduction in female participation was a stylized fact for the transitional 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Russia, and other countries of the Former 
Soviet Union (see Allison and Ringold, 1996). However, evidence on the gender pay gap has 
been less clear-cut.  For instance, Newell and Reilly (2001) report that the gender pay gap 
widened in Bulgaria and Romania, was relatively stable in Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan, but fell in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary.  
The current paper examines the evolution of the gender pay gap for the wage employed in 
Vietnam over the period 1993 to 2002.  The primary objective of this paper is to provide some 
clearer insights on the impact of the reform or post-reform process on the gender pay gap 
among the wage employed. Most of the recent literature on gender in Vietnam to date has 
emphasized the negative effects on women of the transition process in terms of their access to 
public services and their workforce participation (Brassard, 2004; Gallup, 2004; Long et al., 
2000). The recent studies of Liu (2004a,b), using data drawn from household surveys conducted 
in 1993 and 1998, arguably provided the first systematic pieces of research on the gender pay 
gap in Vietnam. The contribution of the current paper, however, compared to Liu (op.cit.), is 
two-fold.  Firstly, our analysis focuses on a longer time period given our use of data drawn from 
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a more recent survey. Secondly, in contrast to the mean regression approach used by Liu, we 
enhance the analysis by using a quantile regression approach that allows us to explore the 
gender pay gap at selected points of the conditional wage distribution. In addition, this study 
also offers a modest contribution to the empirical literature on the temporal decomposition of 
the gender pay gap using the quantile regression approach by suggesting a very simple 
decomposition that may have application in other contexts.  
The structure of the paper can now be outlined. Section two provides a description of the 
datasets to be used in investigating the gender pay gap and notes some facts on female 
participation, female employment, and the gender pay gap using these data. The empirical 
methodology is detailed in section three. The empirical results are reported in section four, 
which is then followed by a section containing some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Data and Overview of the Gender Pay Gap in Vietnam 
2.1 Data 
This paper draws on data from three household surveys comprising the first two rounds of the 
Vietnam Living Standard Surveys (commonly referred as the VLSS 1992/93 and 1997/98) and 
the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 2002 (hereafter VHLSS 2002).2 These surveys 
were conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO) under the technical assistance of the 
World Bank with funding from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The overall approach used in 
these surveys is compliant with the framework used in the World Bank’s Living Standard 
Measurement Surveys. These surveys are thus widely recognized as of high quality and 
nationally representative. 
The VLSS 1992/93 was undertaken using a sample of 4,800 households, of which 4,000 were 
re-interviewed in the VLSS 1997/98, which comprised a sample of 6,000 households in total. 
Although these surveys have been widely used to explore the impact of Doi moi, they have been 
subject to criticism regarding their relatively small sample sizes. This was a primary motive for 
the launch of the second phase of household surveys in 2002 designed to cover the period 2002–
2010. The first survey of this second phase, the VHLSS 2002, collected information from a 
sample of 30,000 households. However, there was no re-interview of households from the 
                                               
2 The VLSS 1992/93 dataset was officially released in 1995, the VLSS 1997/98 in 2000 and the VHLSS 2002 in 
December 2004. 
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original VLSS panel as the sampling frame for this new wave was substantially different from 
earlier rounds.3  
The three surveys included two types of questionnaire: (i) a household questionnaire; and (ii) a 
community questionnaire. The household questionnaire provides a wide range of questions on 
household size and composition, health, education, housing characteristics, employment, 
expenditure and food consumption, ownership of consumer durables, and savings. The 
community questionnaires consist of questions on basic physical and demographic 
characteristics, general economic conditions and economic activities, physical infrastructure 
conditions and transportation, agricultural production at the communal level, as well as 
information on schooling and health facilities in each commune (see World Bank, 2000; 2001 
for details). Although the VHLSS 2002 questionnaires were simplified relative to the earlier 
VLSS, the basic content of the survey remained intact and thus allow, for the purpose of the 
current exercise, the construction of a set of variables that are compatible across all three 
surveys. The next sub-section describes some features of the Vietnamese labour market from a 
gender perspective using data drawn from these surveys.4   
 
2.2 Overview of the Gender Pay Gap in Vietnam 
Vietnam’s labour market is characterized by high participation rates among both men and 
women. Around 84% of Vietnamese men and 82% of women aged 15 to 60 were working in the 
1993-2002 period (see table 1). In rural areas, gender-specific participation rates were even 
higher. These high participation rates are consistent with evidence from the former Soviet 
Union and other CEE centrally planned economies prior to transition. However, the relatively 
stable participation rates for female workers in Vietnam is in contrast to these countries, where 
the contraction in labour force participation was relatively large during the transition period 
(Newell and Reilly, 2001). 
Nearly one-and-a-half million new entrants have joined the labour force annually in Vietnam 
during the 1990s. The rising trend in the unemployment rate, however, suggests that the 
impressive economic growth associated with the reforms has been insufficient to absorb this fast 
growing labour force. As a result, unemployment, defined as those in the labour force and 
                                               
3 The VLSS used the 1989 Population Census as the sampling frame, while the VHLSS 2002 exploited the 
Population and Housing Census from 1999. 
4 This paper presents analysis for the period covering 1993-2002 using these three surveys. As most of the major 
reforms were actually implemented prior to, or in the early part of, this period, the empirical analysis reported is 
likely to reflect the evolution of the gender pay gap in the post Doi moi era (i.e., since the official launch of Doi moi 
at the Sixth Communist Party’s Congress in 1986). However, the process of transition to a fully market-based 
economy remains incomplete in Vietnam, so it is difficult to argue that the country’s economy over the period 
reviewed here had settled on a steady-state equilibrium.     
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actively looking for work, has steadily risen over the 1993-2002 period.5 On average, the male 
unemployment rate was two percentage points higher than the female rate. An explanation for 
this gender differential could be the rapid growth of female worker-intensive exports such as 
garments, footwear, and agricultural products over the past decade (Thornburn et al., 2002) but 
could also reflect the role of ‘discouraged worker’ effects with women more likely to leave the 
labour force than men.   
Table 1 also reveals some notable features regarding Vietnam’s labour market dynamics over 
the period 1993-2002. Non-farm employment has become an increasingly important activity.6 
On average, the employment share in agriculture has fallen by roughly one-fifth for both male 
and female workers. Most of this decrease in agricultural employment appears to have been 
absorbed by an increase in the wage employment sector (see Minot, Epprecht, Tran and Le, 
2006; Pham, 2006; World Bank, 2006).   
Despite the change in the structure of employment, female workers are still more dependent on 
agriculture and self-employment activities than their male counterparts. For instance, wage 
employment accounted for one-fifth of female employment and one-third of male employment 
in the most recent year for which data are available to us. Tran and Le (1998) and UNDP (1996) 
report that the downsizing of the SOEs impacted more adversely on women than men (see 
above). Other studies on Vietnam also reveal that women are more likely to be employed in the 
informal sector than men, a sector largely comprising self-employment and agricultural 
activities (World Bank, 1999). As this sector is generally composed of lower paid jobs, the 
dependence of women on these two sources of employment suggests they may be poorly placed 
in terms of labour market wage rewards compared to men.7  However, this is not an issue 
investigated in this paper given our exclusive emphasis on the wage employment sector.   
The average real wage rate has grown rapidly by an average of 12% per annum over the period 
1993-2002. Other studies on Vietnam’s labour market during the 1990s also reported a rapid 
growth in wages rates. Nga (2002) and Gallup (2004), using data from the first two rounds of 
the household living standard surveys, report a 10% increase in the annual growth rate of hourly 
wages. It is notable that the increasing wage trend observed for Vietnam is contrary to what was 
found for other transitional economies in the earliest phases of their transition to a market 
economy (Rutkowski, 1996).   
                                               
5 The unemployment rate rose from roughly 4.4% in 1993 to 8.4% in 2002. Note that these estimates from the 
surveys are slightly higher than the official statistics reported by the GSO (2006), where the unemployment rate was 
six percent in 2002. 
6 Off-farm employment refers to income-generating activities distinct from working on one’s own farms, forest plots, 
and watersurface etc.  See, for instance, Minot et al. (2006) and Pham (2006) for a discussion on the different types of 
non-farm activities in Vietnam. 
7 See Pham (2006) for a discussion on the gender dimension to rural employment over the post Doi moi era. 
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The rapid growth in real average wages in Vietnam was accompanied by a sharp improvement 
in the relative female position in the labour market over time (see table 2). In 1993, an average 
female worker earned roughly three-quarters of the average male in terms of hourly wages. Ten 
years on, the average female earned 88% of this average. The same pattern of change in the 
gender pay gap is also observed when comparing gender pay gaps across regions, educational 
attainment levels and employment sectors over time.  The relative female wage position is better 
in the public than in the private sector, which is consistent with evidence from other transitional 
economies (see Jurajda, 2003 for the case of the Czech Republic). There is almost no difference 
in the earnings levels of those with less than upper secondary education and those with tertiary 
educational qualifications in the early years of the transition. This reflects the low return to 
education widely observed in many transitional economies in the early stages of reform (Newell 
and Reilly, 1999). The raw returns to education appear highest in the latter half of the 1998-
2002 period. Among the five different educational attainment levels, the mean wage rate of 
those with tertiary level education has grown faster than those with lower levels. Workers with 
tertiary educational qualifications earn considerably more than those with secondary education. 
In terms of the gender pay gap across educational levels, though the female disadvantage 
appears to have slightly widened between the last two years reviewed, it narrowed over the 
entire 1993-2002 period.   
The same pattern of a comparative improvement in the female relative wage position was also 
found in many transitional economies in Central and Eastern Europe such as Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Newell and Reilly, 2001). Brainerd (2000) also reports six of 
the eight post-communist countries she examined experienced an improvement in their female 
relative wage position. This pattern is also in line with the empirical evidence reported for the 
gender pay gap in early stages of economic reform in China (Kidd and Meng, 2001; Liu, 1998; 
Ying, 2007). It is important to note that the amelioration in the relative female wage position, as 
suggested by the temporal change in the ratio reported in table 2, does not imply a decrease in 
gender inequality more broadly defined. For instance, Hunt (2002) noted that the dramatic 
contraction in the gender pay gap among East German women was largely attributable to the 
selective withdrawal from wage employment of less qualified women in terms of both 
observables and unobservables. In the context of Vietnam, Le (2006) demonstrates that while 
the gender pay gap in the formal sector narrowed during the transition, gender inequality across 
other dimensions remains a significant policy issue. And other studies reveal that, although 
women were generally better-off as a result of the comprehensive reforms undertaken during 
 7 
Doi moi, gains were not distributed equally across income groups, regions, and ethnic groups 
(see Goodkind, 1995; PTF, 2002; Long et al., 2000; Le, 2006).8  
 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
Following the seminal work of Mincer (1974), it is conventional to specify log wages as a 
function of a set of wage determining characteristics, which in its most austere form includes 
controls for human capital.  The specification is then augmented to capture other variables 
interpreted as important to the wage determination process. In the empirical literature on the 
gender pay gap, the separation of the data points by gender is widely adopted in undertaking 
gender pay gap decomposition analysis. The gender-specific wage equations for the ith 
individual are specified as follows: 
mmmm XW mb += '                                                                                                                     (1) 
ffff XW mb += '                                                                                                                     (2)  
where Xj is a (k ´ n) matrix of productivity and other characteristics (e.g., education, labour 
force experience etc.) and j is the gender subscript; b is a (k ´ 1) vector of unknown parameters 
representing the effect of various covariates on the log wage (W); m is a (n ´ 1) vector of 
random error terms; and m and f denote male and female sub-samples, respectively.   
The Oaxaca (1973) methodology has been widely used to decompose the average gender pay 
gap between men and women using the OLS estimation of gender-specific wage equations. The 
mean gender difference in log wages is conventionally given by:   
)ˆˆ('ˆ)'( fmfmfmfm XXXWW bbb -+-=-                                                                             (3) 
where the ‘bars’ denote mean values and ‘hats’ denote the OLS coefficient estimates in this 
case. This allows the overall average differential in wages between the two gender groups to be 
decomposed into a part attributable to differences in characteristics (known as the ‘explained’ or 
‘endowment’ effect) and a part attributable to differences in the estimated relationship between 
men and women (alternatively defined as the ‘unexplained’, ‘treatment’ or ‘residual’ effect).  
The latter part of expression (3) is sometimes taken to capture the effect of unequal treatment 
(or discrimination) in the labor market.   
                                               
8 As the primary focus of this paper is on the gender pay gap in the wage employment sector, other dimensions of 
gender inequality are not discussed. See Goodkind (1995), Croll (1998), Tran and Le (1998), Tran (1999), PTF 
(2002), Long et al. (2000),  Le (2006) for other issues germane to Vietnamese gender inequality. 
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The use of this approach is subject to the conventional ‘index number’ problem.  It is clear that 
expression (3) could be re-computed using the ‘basket’ of average male characteristics, which 
potentially yields different numerical values than (3).  Thus:9 
)ˆˆ('ˆ)'( fmmffmfm XXXWW bbb -+-=-                                                                             (4) 
The foregoing decompositions are situated within a mean regression framework.  An exclusive 
focus on the average, however, provides an incomplete account of the gender pay gap.  The 
quantile regression approach allows the gender pay gap to be estimated at particular quantiles of 
the conditional wage distribution as opposed to simply the mean. The estimation of a set of 
conditional quantile functions allows for a more detailed portrait of the relationship between the 
conditional distribution of the wage and selected covariates than provided by a mean regression. 
In contrast to the OLS approach, the quantile regression procedure is less sensitive to outliers 
and provides a more robust estimator in the face of departures from normality (Koenker, 2005; 
Koenker and Basset, 1978). In addition, Deaton (1997, pp.80-85) notes that quantile regression 
models may also have better properties than OLS in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Using 
this methodology, the log wage equation may be estimated conditional on a given specification 
and then calculated at various percentiles of the residuals (e.g., 10th, 25th, 50th 75th or 90th (see 
Chamberlain, 1994)).      
In the current case, the quantile regression for the male sub-sample can be defined as: 
mmmm XW qq mb += '                                                                                                                   (5) 
where mmmm XXWQ qq b')( =  and 0)( =mm XQ qq m , mqb denotes the unknown male 
parameter vector for the qth quantile, and q denotes the chosen quantile. Similarly, the quantile 
regression for the female sub-sample can also be defined as: 
ffff XW qq mb += '                                        (6) 
with ffff XXWQ qq b')( =  and 0)( =ff XQ qq m  
From equations (5) and (6): 
))((ˆ))'(()( mmmmmmmm WQWEWQWXEWQ qqqqq mb =+==                                           (7) 
                                               
9 Given the linear nature of the components, the computation of the sampling variances for the two parts is a 
relatively straight-forward exercise.   
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and  
))((ˆ))'(()( ffffffff WQWEWQWXEWQ qqqqq mb =+==                                             (8) 
In these expressions, characteristics are evaluated conditionally at the unconditional quantile log 
wage value and not unconditionally as in the case of the mean regression approach.  The two 
expressions ))(( mmm WQWE qqm = and ))(( fff WQWE qqm = are non-zero. From (7) and (8), 
the gender pay gap at the qth quantile is defined as Dq and this can be decomposed into three 
parts: 
))](())(([
)ˆˆ())]'(([
ˆ))]'(())(([
fffmmm
fmfff
mfffmmm
WQWEWQWE
WQWXE
WQWXEWQWXE
qqqq
qqq
qqqq
mm
bb
b
=-=+
-=+
=-==D
                                                 (9)                                      
This can be re-written more compactly as: 
qqqqqq bb Rfm +DW+DW=D ˆ'ˆ'                                                                                             (10) 
where )ˆˆ(ˆ fm qqq bbb -=D  
fm qqq W-W=DW  where ))(( ffff WQWXE qq ==W and ))(( mmmm WQWXE qq ==W  
))](())(([ fffmmm WQWEWQWER qqqqq mm =-==  
The estimates for this procedure are also sensitive to the structure assumed under equal 
treatment and the gender pay gap can also be decomposed as: 
qqqqqq bb Rmf +DW+DW=D ˆ'ˆ'                                                                                             (11) 
Using mean characteristics in the computation of expressions (10) and (11) may provide 
misleading realizations for the basket of characteristics at points other than the conditional mean 
wage to which they actually relate. Therefore, it is necessary to use realizations for a basket of 
gender-specific characteristics that more accurately reflect the relevant points on the conditional 
wage distribution.  The auxiliary regression-based framework outlined in Gardeazabal and 
Ugidos (2005) provides one approach that has been used in other studies to obtain the empirical 
realizations for these characteristics (see Hyder and Reilly, 2005 for an application). In this 
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paper, however, we use a variation of an approach originally suggested by Machado and Mata 
(2005) to derive the characteristics at different quantiles of the wage distribution. From each of 
the male and female sub-samples, 100 observations are randomly drawn with replacement. Each 
observation once ranked comprises a percentile point on the wage distribution. The full set of 
characteristics for the observation at the qth wage quantile is then retrieved. This process is 
replicated 200 times to obtain 200 observations at the qth quantile.10 The mean characteristics of 
these observations at each quantile are then used to construct the realizations for fm qq WW ,  in 
equations (10) and (11) above.11  
In the context of the quantile regression approach, we use a relatively ad hoc method for the 
temporal decomposition of the gender pay gap at selected quantiles. The overall gender pay gap 
at the qth quantile can be expressed as: 
000000
ˆ'ˆ' qqqqqq bb Rfm +DW+DW=D                                                                                     (12) 
111111
ˆ'ˆ' qqqqqq bb Rfm +DW+DW=D                                                                                       (13) 
where 0 denotes the early and 1 the later year. The temporal decomposition of the gender pay 
gap is as follows: 
)()ˆˆ(')ˆˆ('
ˆ)'(ˆ)'(
01010010
10110101
qqqqqqqq
qqqqqqqq
bbbb
bb
RRfmm
ffm
-+D-DW+-DW+
DW-W+DW-DW=D-D
                                               (14) 
Thus, the overall change in the gender pay gap between two years at the qth quantile can be 
decomposed into five parts.  The first part is attributable to the temporal change in the gender 
differential in realizations of observable characteristics at the qth quantile of the wage 
distribution evaluated using male coefficients. The second part is attributable to the temporal 
change in the realizations of the observable female characteristics at the qth quantile of the wage 
distribution.  The third part is attributable to the temporal change in the male wage structure at 
the qth quantile of the wage distribution.  The fourth term is attributable to the temporal change 
in unequal treatment (or wage discrimination) at the qth quantile of the wage distribution.  The 
final term is unexplained and may be attributable to the changing role of unobservables over 
                                               
10 These represent more modest numbers for both draws and replications than used by Machado and Mata (2005) in 
their analysis. 
11 The sampling variances for the quantile regression estimates are obtained using bootstrapping with 200 
replications.  Given the linear nature of the ‘treatment’ and ‘endowment’ components in (12) and (13), the sampling 
variances are again easily computable.  However, it is acknowledged that the use of the bootstrapped variance-
covariance matrix may not be entirely desirable here for the computation of the sampling variance of a point estimate, 
since the bootstrap procedure is best interpretable as providing a confidence interval for the point estimate.    
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time. As expression (14) is subject to an ‘index number’ problem, the temporal gender pay gap 
can also be re-cast as: 
)()ˆˆ(')ˆˆ('
ˆ)'(ˆ)'(
01010010
10110101
qqqqqqqq
qqqqqqqq
bbbb
bb
RRmff
mmf
-+D-DW+-DW+
DW-W+DW-DW=D-D
              (15) 
The temporal decomposition suggested by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) could be used to 
decompose the average pay gap over time and estimates based on this procedure using the mean 
regression analysis are reported below (see footnote 24).                                            
  
4. Specification Issues and Empirical Results  
4.1    Wage Specification Issues  
Real hourly wage rates are used in the regression analysis undertaken in this study. The wage 
measure includes basic rates and other payments in terms of bonuses, allowances, subsidies in 
cash and kind.12 This definition of the wage has been widely used in studies on Vietnam such as 
Glewwe, Gragnolati, and Zaman (2002) and Liu (op.cit.). The nominal hourly wage rates are 
deflated by the monthly CPI to yield a real hourly wage rate.13 The natural logarithms of these 
real wage rates are then used in the augmented Mincerian wage equations, which control for, 
inter alia, human capital, ethnicity and other characteristics (see table A1 for variable 
descriptions and selected summary statistics).  
A ‘years of schooling’ variable has often been used in the standard human capital wage 
specification as this is most compatible with basic Mincerian theory (see Psacharopoulos, 1994; 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). In our case, the schooling years would have to be 
computed from information on the highest educational qualifications attained as reported in the 
household surveys.14 However, as demonstrated in other studies, this might introduce noise into 
the measurement of this variable with consequences for a downward bias in the corresponding 
schooling estimate (for instance see Duraisamy, 2002). We thus exploit a set of mutually 
exclusive dummies for educational attainment to capture human capital effects.15 In addition, as 
actual labour force experience was not reported in the surveys, the age of an individual (and its 
                                               
12 These ‘other payments’ are, on average, 9% in the total earnings overall over the 1993-2002 period. 
13 The deflation has no material impact on our analysis of the gender pay gap, since inflation effects are likely to be 
gender-neutral. However, it facilitates a comparison of wages over time (see table 2). 
14 These surveys do not report years-in-school information. Instead, only the highest qualifications obtained or an 
individual’s current level of study is reported (see World Bank 2000, 2001 for details). 
15 This approach is adopted by Newell and Reilly (1999) in their analysis of selected transitional economies. 
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quadratic term) is used to proxy for labor market experience rather than using a potential labor 
force measure as in Liu (2004a). It should be noted that the inclusion of an age variable does not 
fully capture the effect of labor market experience on wages, but it avoids potential problems 
that could be introduced into our analysis if a potential labor force experience measure was 
actually used in its place.16 The use of age and its quadratic to proxy for actual labor force 
experience is clearly more problematic and is obviously less accurate for females than males. Its 
use in preference to an actual measure may over-state the magnitude of the unequal treatment 
effect as Wright and Ermisch (1991) detected when comparing discrimination effects based on 
potential and actual labor force measures using data for the United Kingdom. This measurement 
issue is acknowledged as a constraint in the current application but data limitations prevent use 
of a more accurate variable.17 
The set of other regressors in the wage equations include worker characteristics (such as marital 
and health status);18 social exclusion which is proxied by ethnic origin; and ownership type. A 
set of seven regional dummies are also included in the wage regression models. Furthermore, it 
is reasonable to argue that adjusting the nominal wage rates by the monthly price deflator does 
not fully capture potential seasonal effects. This is particularly the case for rural non-farm 
activities, which can be linked to harvest time during a particular year. Consequently, a set of 
dummies for the interview date are also included to control for potential seasonal effects in the 
wage determination process.19  
The data available do not allow us to fully capture an individual’s unobserved ability, school 
quality or socio-economic background.  The failure to control for these factors potentially 
results in overestimated returns to the education variables (Heckman and Hotz, 1986; Benell, 
1996; Card, 1999; Bauer and Haisken-DeNew, 2001). However, as the primary interest of the 
                                               
16 The use of a potential labor force variable, measured as age minus years of schooling minus the enrolment age, 
suffers from two major problems. Firstly, the coefficient corresponding to the education variable, when this measure 
is used, can be shown to be downward biased. Secondly, as an individual’s years in schooling were not reported, 
using the computed years of schooling to construct potential experience would thus introduce measurement error 
providing another source of bias in the wage equation estimates.  
17 In the VLSS 1992/93 and the VLSS 1997/98, there is information on the length of experience in the current job. 
However, this information provides an inaccurate measure of the actual labor force experience because the 
information on experience from previous jobs is not reported. In addition, information on current job tenure is 
unavailable in the most recent VHLSS 2002 thus vitiating the use of compatible wage specifications across the three 
years  
18 Long et al. (2000) report an important role for marital status in the labour market behaviour of women, especially 
in rural areas. Previous studies on wages in Vietnam also report a sizable effect of marital status on wages (see Liu, 
2004a; Brassard, 2004). The inclusion of this variable in the wage equation represents a judgement call but allows us 
to determine whether employers use this indicator to exercise gender discrimination in terms of the wage.  In 
addition, it could also be argued that both marital and health status are endogenous outcomes.  However, given that 
both outcomes are likely to predate the wage outcomes observed, we believe their treatment as exogenous measures 
in the current specification is relatively innocuous.     
19 As seasonality effects on the gender pay gap are likely to be negligible, control for seasonality is more a wage 
specification issue rather than an attempt to capture any effect on the gender wage gap. As rural employment and 
wages might be subject to seasonality, it is thus desirable to include this variable in the wage regression models.  
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current paper is on the gender wage gap, it could be argued that the over-estimation of these 
effects is gender-neutral and thus might not seriously impact on the gender pay gap effects 
reported in this paper.  
The problem of selectivity bias, as mediated through either participation or selection into wage 
employment, is a potential issue for both the mean and quantile regression models. The 
selection effects associated with participation may be of less importance given the high 
participation rates already noted for both gender groups in Vietnam.  The wage employment 
selection process is clearly more of an issue.  The fact that there are more than two possible 
employment outcomes in the labor market (see table 1) suggests use of the Lee (1983) method, 
which extends the more standard Heckman two-step procedure to multiple-outcome cases. 
Following Liu (2004a), the identification of the selection effect was explored using household 
structure variables (i.e., the number of children and the dependency ratio within the household  
etc.) and non-labour income.20 The educational levels of household heads and household socio-
economic background, variables that potentially capture some form of ‘network’ effects, were 
also used as additional instruments. However, the estimates corresponding to the selection 
correction terms were not well determined, a finding that proved invariant to the use of a 
dichotomous selection process within the more standard Heckman two-step procedure (i.e., 
whether an individual is in wage employment or not).21 There is a suspicion that the instruments 
used may be weak as they were poorly correlated with the probability of wage employment and 
efforts to obtain superior instruments proved futile given the limited nature of the data available. 
This outcome is unsurprising given the fact that the two-step procedures have been subject to 
criticism given their sensitivity to both distributional assumptions and identifying restrictions 
(Manski, 1995). In addition, the techniques required to correct for selectivity bias in quantile 
regression models are less well developed, though Buchinsky (2001) suggests an approach that 
exploits the work of Newey (1999). However, there remain complications that arise in regard to 
identifying the constant term in quantile wage regression models when higher order terms are 
used to capture the selection effects as suggested by Newey (1999). This is a relatively 
important issue in any pay gap application (see Hyder and Reilly, 2005). Given the difficulties 
encountered in obtaining plausible and relevant instruments to identify the selection effects and 
potential complications in modelling selection within a quantile framework, we eschew the use 
of selection correction procedures for either the mean or quantile log wage regression models.  
                                               
20 The use of non-labour income but particularly household structure and family background in the employment 
selection process is relatively common in the labour economics literature. The non-labour income in our case includes 
government pension, subsidies, remittances, interest from savings, grants and scholarships and is thus unrelated to 
past labour activity. 
21 It should be noted that defining employment outcomes dichotomously using whether an individual is in wage 
employment or not is statistically rejected on the basis of Wald tests using estimates from the three-category 
multinomial logit model. These test results are not reported here for brevity but available from the authors on request. 
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The econometric specification used in the current study differs slightly from that of Liu (2004,a) 
in a number of key respects that go beyond issues relating to the correction for selection bias. 
Firstly, educational levels and the individual’s age are used instead of years in schooling and 
potential labour force experience respectively. This is to avoid the introduction of a possible 
measurement error in key explanatory variables (see footnote 16 above). Secondly, occupation 
controls for the wage employed workers are not included in our regression models. This is a 
judgement call and we take the view that the inclusion of controls that may reflect the outcome 
of a labor market discriminatory process is undesirable in this case. In addition, there is also a 
concern regarding the potential endogeneity of the occupational attachment variables. Finally, in 
contrast to Liu (2004,a), we also introduce controls for the interview date to capture possible 
seasonality effects and introduce an individual’s health status to capture human capital depletion 
effects. 
4.2    Empirical Results  
The wage regression estimates, using the mean and the quantile regression models, are provided 
in tables A2 to A7 of the Appendix but are not the subject of detailed discussion here. However, 
it is worth reporting that the fits of the augmented Mincerian equations have improved for both 
gender groups over the time period reviewed and the point estimates for the ceteris paribus 
returns to the higher levels of formal human capital have increased sharply relative to the no 
schooling base group. This could be taken to reflect the enhanced role of the labour market in 
valuing human capital assets in Vietnam over and beyond the reform period.22 
The first rows of table A2 to A4 report ceteris paribus gender pay gaps estimated over the 
period 1993-2002 using a pooled wage regression model with a gender intercept term. The 
estimates reflect the improvements in the relative female wage position already noted from the 
raw data.  For instance, in 1993 a male wage employee earned 31% more than a comparable 
female, on average and ceteris paribus, but by 1998 the ‘mark-up’ had declined to 19% and 
exhibited stability thereafter to 2002. The findings on the gender pay gap in regard to the two 
earlier years are in line with other empirical studies on the gender pay gap for Vietnam (Nga, 
2002; Gallup, 2004; Liu, 2004, a).  
The first rows of table A2 to A4 also provide the estimated gender effects at different quantiles 
of the conditional wage distribution. These estimates suggest considerable improvements in the 
female relative wage position in the Vietnamese labour market. The gender pay gap tends to 
                                               
22 As noted earlier, as this paper does not control for ability, schooling quality, socio-economic 
background, and selection bias (see text), the returns to educational level may be overestimated, and thus 
need to be interpreted with some degree of caution. 
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display a modest decrease with movement across the conditional wage distribution. This 
tentatively suggests that gender pay inequality is larger in the low-paid than the high-paid jobs 
though this is interrogated more closely using the decompositions reported below. The 
decreasing ceteris paribus gender pay gap across the different quantiles of the conditional wage 
distribution, however, is in marked contrast to what is commonly observed in other transitional 
economies where a ‘glass-ceiling’ effect is evident at higher points of the conditional wage 
distribution (see Reilly, 1999 and Newell and Reilly, 2001). 
The separation of the data points between the male and female sub-samples is statistically 
justified on the basis of Wald test values for both the mean and quantile regression models for 
all three years.23 The estimation of separate wage equations allows for the implementation of the 
various gender pay gap decomposition methodologies both at the mean and selected quantiles. 
In reviewing the estimates reported in tables 3a to 3c, the contraction in the gender pay gap 
between 1993 and the later years is again evident. In all years, the greater part of the gender pay 
gap is attributable to unequal treatment with respect to gender. However, in contrast to the 
results reported in tables A2 to A4, which uses an intercept shift to capture gender effects, the 
treatment effects appear stable across the selected quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. 
This finding is invariant to which wage structure is assumed in the absence of unequal 
treatment.             
There is a substantial contraction in the average gender pay gap over time.  The raw gender pay 
gap contracted by 0.14 log points between 1993 and 2002, which represents almost a halving of 
the gap.24 The contraction in the gender pay gap over these two years is also evident at selected 
points on the conditional wage distribution, though it is more pronounced at the top rather than 
the bottom end of the distribution (see tables 4a to 4c). In fact, the change in the overall gender 
difference between 1993 and 2002 is poorly determined at the 10th percentile. The quantile 
gender pay gaps between 1993 and 2002 are decomposed using both expressions (14) and (15). 
The change in observable characteristics at the 10th percentile and changes in observable gender 
differentials account for most of the contraction. This suggests that the narrowing gender pay 
gap at the bottom end of the distribution might again be attributable to the selective withdrawal 
from the Vietnamese labour market of the more poorly qualified woman in terms of their 
observable characteristics.  At the top end of the wage distribution the gender pay gap 
contracted by 0.19 log points over these two years with changes in observable gender 
                                               
23 The relevant Wald tests for separation by gender are reported in tables A2 to A4 of the Appendix.    
24 This mean contraction was examined using the procedure suggested by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991). The 
greatest part of the reduction was found to be assigned to the unobservables that improved the percentile ranking of 
the average Vietnamese female in the male residual wage distribution. This may reflect the fact that Vietnamese 
women poorly qualified in terms of both observables and unobservables selectively withdrew from wage employment 
over the time period reviewed here.     
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differentials and wage structure exerting an important  narrowing role regardless of whether 
expression (14) or (15) is used to undertake the decomposition. The change in unobservables 
appears important in explaining the contraction in the gap over time at the 90th percentile. The 
reduction in unequal treatment of men and women appears an important driver for the reduced 
gender pay gap at the 25th, the median and 75th quantiles. Thus, the underlying narrative 
regarding the contraction of the gender pay is somewhat nuanced and interpretation is sensitive 
to the selected point on the conditional wage distribution examined.                 
 
5. Conclusions  
The Doi moi reforms have had a significant impact on the labour market in Vietnam and appear 
to have acted to reduce gender pay disparities in the wage employment sector. The average 
gender pay gap in this sector halved between 1993 and 2002 with most of the reduction 
achieved by 1998. There is thus some evidence that over more recent years the average gap has 
been characterised by a degree of stability.  It is difficult to isolate the factors responsible for 
this contraction but the selective withdrawal from wage employment of poorly qualified 
Vietnamese women, in terms of both observable and unobservable characteristics, is flagged as 
one possible source for this phenomenon (see footnote 24). Hunt (2002) assigned much of the 
improvement in the relative wage position of East German women post-unification to the 
selective withdrawal from the labour market of the most poorly qualified. Alternatively, the 
contraction in the pay gap may also be attributable to the labour market valuing the 
unobervables characteristics of women who selecting into wage employment more highly than 
was the case pre-reform.  However, a definitive conclusion on this matter is beyond the scope of 
the current paper and would require more detailed analysis of the Vietnamese case than that 
offered here, and, moreover, could only be usefully informed by exploitation of panel data.  
A novel contribution of this paper has been the examination of the degree to which the gender 
pay gap varies across the conditional wage distribution.  The decompositions suggest that, in 
contrast to many transitional economies, the gender pay gap attributable to the treatment effect 
is relatively stable across the conditional wage distribution. In comport with the mean 
regression findings, there has also been a contraction in the gender pay at most selected points 
of the conditional wage distribution with the observed effect most pronounced at the top end of 
this distribution. The change in unobservables appears important in explaining the contraction in 
the gap over time at the 90th percentile which is again resonant of our unreported findings for 
the mean regression. However, the reduction in the unequal labour market treatment of women 
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only appears an important driver for the reduced gender pay gap in the central parts of the 
conditional wage distribution.  
The observed reduction in gender wage disparity overall is, from a policy perspective, 
interpretable in a positive light. However, it is not clear if this improvement is attributable to 
deliberate policies targeted at gender main-streaming, as the issue of the gender pay gap has not 
been highlighted or emphasized in the government’s gender development strategy documents. 
For instance, the country’s Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CRPGS) 
incorporates gender perspectives in all fields (SRV, 2003), but the strategy is not transparent as 
to how the gender wage gap features in this framework. This omission is also characteristic of 
the National Action Plan for the Advancement of Women 2001-2005, and 2006-2010 (see 
UNDP, 2004 for summary of these Plans).25 It may be taken to suggest that though gender 
development has been emphasized in the country’s development strategy, the gender pay gap 
has not been considered as an important part of the gender main-streaming process. As Vietnam 
continues its economic growth, the wage employment sector will, in all likelihood, rapidly 
expand. Given the country’s economic development, it is likely to undergo a more radical 
structural change away from light labour-intensive export-oriented industries towards more 
heavier capital-intensive industries. This might have entirely different impacts on the labour 
market than heretofore, and the effects for female workers and their wages are thus unclear. In 
this context, it appears reasonable to encourage a stronger government focus on the gender pay 
disparity within the country’s overall gender main-streaming framework.  
We believe our analysis provides an informative portrait of the gender pay gap in the 
Vietnamese wage employment sector over a recent time period, but this sector only comprised a 
quarter of those at work in Vietnam in 2002.  It should be stressed, therefore, that this study 
offers only a partial insight into the effect of the Doi moi reforms on women within the 
Vietnamese labour market.  The sizeable contraction in the gender wage gap among the wage 
employed is a welcome aspect of the transformation process.  However, this finding should not 
be over-emphasized and some perspective is clearly required.  For instance, our analysis did not 
examine the impact of the reform process on other important female employment sectors (e.g., 
the self-employed or those employed in the informal sector) or the implications for those 
women discouraged from retaining links with the formal labour market.  The impact of 
enterprise re-structuring, the re-shaping of social safety nets and child-care facilities, and the 
changing demands on female non-market time may exert more important influences on the 
quality of women’s lives in Vietnam in the near future than the evolution of the gender pay gap 
in the wage employment sector.  These issues clearly merit investigation in their own right in 
                                               
25 These two documents contain the key strategies adopted by Vietnam in promoting gender mainstreaming within 
the Beijing Platform as endorsed at the 1995 Bejing UN Conference on Women (see UNDP, 2004 for more details). 
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order to document and understand more fully the changing position of women in the 
Vietnamese labour market.      
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Table 1: Labour Force Participation and Unemployment 
 1993 1998 2002 
Labour force participation (%) 82.31 80.51 83.44 
Male participation 84.49 81.56 84.26 
- Rural 87.28 85.09 86.17 
- Urban 74.65 73.14 78.07 
Female participation 80.38 79.55 82.64 
- Rural 82.95 84.72 86.05 
- Urban 71.58 67.62 72.04 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.39 3.93 8.59 
Male unemployment rate 5.8 5.81 9.77 
- Rural 3.63 4.03 8.31 
- Urban 9.62 8.18 12.93 
Female unemployment rate 3.41 2.36 7.55 
- Rural 2.97 1.94 7.38 
- Urban 4.3 2.82 7.83 
Structure of employment (%)    
Employment in agriculture 64.06 54.91 52.45 
- Male 61.28 51.10 49.30 
- Female 66.64 58.51 55.57 
Wage employment 17.78 22.92 27.64 
- Male 22.45 28.45 34.33 
- Female 13.44 17.69 21.04 
Self-employment and others 18.16 22.18 19.90 
- Male 16.27 20.46 16.37 
- Female 19.92 23.81 23.39 
Source: authors’ calculations from the VLSS 1992/93; VLSS 1997/98; and VHLSS 2002;  
Notes:  
a. Labour force consists of those aged from 15 to 60 years old;  
b. Employment is defined as having jobs over the past 7 days before the surveys; 
unemployment is defined as those in the labour force, who were not working over the past 
7 days before the surveys, but were looking for a job;  
c. Employment outcomes are classified on the basis of primary employment; ‘others’ include 
those who are employed by household businesses and household enterprises.  
 
Table 2: The Structure of Wage and Gender Way Gap, 1993-2002 
 1993 1998 2002 
 Male Female F/M ratio Male Female F/M ratio Male Female F/M ratio 
Real hourly wage rates 1.9570 1.4810 0.7568 3.2514 2.8493 0.8763 4.2698 3.7629 0.8813 
 (1.097) (0.909)  (2.198) (2.212)  (2.963) (2.783)  
Wage by sector          
- Private sector wage 1.9796 1.4184 0.7165 3.1517 2.4796 0.7868 3.6878 3.0366 0.8234 
- Public sector wage 1.9063 1.5623 0.8195 3.4314 3.3223 0.9682 5.4758 4.7764 0.8723 
Rural vs. urban          
- Urban wage 2.0281 1.5148 0.7469 3.8020 3.2130 0.8451 5.2800 4.4854 0.8495 
- Rural wage 1.9018 1.4409 0.7576 2.7463 2.4040 0.8754 3.5940 3.1525 0.8772 
Mean wages by education levels          
- Lower secondary and below 1.9073 1.4949 0.7838 2.9678 2.3573 0.7943 3.4872 2.8798 0.8258 
- Upper secondary education 2.0815 1.4488 0.6961 3.4535 3.1607 0.9152 4.5288 4.0319 0.8903 
- Higher education 1.8551 1.4818 0.7988 4.2169 3.8665 0.9169 5.9858 5.1836 0.8660 
Mean wages by regions          
- Northern Uplands 1.4537 0.9756 0.6711 2.5901 2.5271 0.9757 4.2361 4.1997 0.9914 
- Red River Delta 1.6616 1.2791 0.7698 3.0607 3.0101 0.9835 3.9873 3.6582 0.9175 
- North Central Coast 1.6014 1.1925 0.7447 2.7194 2.4063 0.8849 3.8449 3.5605 0.9260 
- South Central Coast 1.6666 1.4101 0.8461 2.7974 2.2986 0.8217 4.1830 3.5604 0.8512 
- Central Highlands 2.3414 1.4188 0.6060 2.8478 2.7256 0.9571 6.3600 5.5126 0.8668 
- Southeast 2.4413 1.8275 0.7486 4.2492 3.3726 0.7937 4.5040 3.6758 0.8161 
- Mekong River Delta 2.1149 1.5275 0.7223 2.9165 2.5215 0.8646 4.0131 3.1849 0.7936 
Source: authors’ calculations from the VLSS 1992/93; VLSS 1997/97; and VHLSS 2002.  
Notes:  
a. hourly wage rates include all payments in cash and in-kind;  
b. ‘public sector’ includes those who work in the public services sectors;  
c. ‘lower secondary school and others’ include those with educational attainment level from lower secondary;  
d. F/M ratio is calculated as the ratio of average female hourly pay to its average male counterpart;  
e. standard deviations for continuous variables are reported in parentheses
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Table 3a: Decomposition Results at Mean and Quantiles, 2002 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Mean 
Actual wage gap 0.2453*** 0.1934*** 0.1538*** 0.1093*** 0.1097*** 0.1503*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) 
Oaxaca-Blinder       
Female characteristics¦       
Explained effect -0.0391*** -0.0256*** -0.0402*** -0.0330*** -0.0301*** -0.0241*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Unexplained effect 0.2051*** 0.1711*** 0.1650*** 0.1577*** 0.1406*** 0.1744*** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) 
Unobservable effect 0.0794 0.0479 0.0289 -0.0154 -0.0008 0.0000 
Male characteristics§       
Explained effect -0.0455*** -0.0457*** -0.0565*** -0.0274*** -0.0677*** -0.0346*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Unexplained effect 0.2115*** 0.1912*** 0.1814*** 0.1521*** 0.1782*** 0.1849*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) 
Unobservable effect 0.0794 0.0479 0.0289 -0.0154 -0.0008 0.0000 
 
Table 3b: Decomposition Results at Mean and Quantiles, 1998 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Mean 
Actual wage gap 0.1971*** 0.1480*** 0.1461*** 0.1159** 0.1551** 0.1474*** 
 (0.038) (0.024) (0.023) (0.047) (0.056) (0.022) 
Oaxaca-Blinder       
Female characteristics¦       
Explained effect 0.0500*** -0.0133 -0.0493*** -0.0541*** -0.0415** -0.0162 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) 
Unexplained effect 0.1112** 0.1894*** 0.1817*** 0.1756*** 0.1580*** 0.1636*** 
 (0.043) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.041) (0.022) 
Unobservable effect 0.0359 -0.0280 0.0137 -0.0006 0.0386 0.0000 
Male characteristics§       
Explained effect -0.0080 -0.0048 -0.0579*** -0.0652*** -0.0304 -0.0370*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.013) 
Unexplained effect 0.1692*** 0.1808*** 0.1903*** 0.1867*** 0.1469*** 0.1844*** 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.035) (0.017) 
Unobservable effect 0.0359 -0.0280 0.0137 -0.0006 0.0386 0.0000 
 
Table 3c: Decomposition Results at Mean and Quantiles, 1993 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Mean 
Actual wage gap 0.3311*** 0.3167*** 0.2968*** 0.3056 0.3031*** 0.2897*** 
 (0.080) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035) (0.050) (0.029) 
Oaxaca-Blinder       
Female characteristics¦       
Explained effect 0.0470 0.0552** -0.0052 0.0179 -0.0011 0.0273* 
 (0.029) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Unexplained effect 0.2245*** 0.2460*** 0.3312*** 0.2850*** 0.2519*** 0.2624*** 
 (0.065) (0.044) (0.035) (0.040) (0.056) (0.030) 
Unobservable effect 0.0596 0.0155 -0.0292 0.0027 0.0523 0.0000 
Male characteristics§       
Explained effect 0.0280 0.0100 -0.0506** -0.0084 0.0371 -0.0077 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.030) (0.017) 
Unexplained effect 0.2435*** 0.2912*** 0.3766*** 0.3113*** 0.2138*** 0.2974*** 
 (0.046) (0.034) (0.028) (0.031) (0.045) (0.024) 
Unobservable effect 0.0596 0.0155 -0.0292 0.0027 0.0523 0.0000 
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Notes:  
a. ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level of 
0.01; 0.05; and 0.1 respectively;  
b. standard errors are in parentheses; 
c. ¦: using expression (3) for mean regression model and expression (10) for quantile regression models; 
d. §: using expression (4) for for mean regression model and expression (11) for quantile regression models. 
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Table 4a: Temporal Decomposition of the Gender Pay Gap: Quantile Regression Approach, 1993-2002 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Actual changes in differential -0.0858 -0.1233*** -0.1430*** -0.1962*** -0.1934*** 
 (0.081) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.053) 
Female characteristics¦¦      
Change in Observable Gender Differentials -0.0308* -0.0341*** -0.0458*** -0.0265** -0.0566*** 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) 
Change in Observable Characteristics -0.0678*** -0.0473*** 0.0156*** 0.0492*** 0.0612*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Change in Wage Structure -0.0183 -0.0324*** -0.0238** -0.0732*** -0.0546*** 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) 
Change in Unequal Treatment 0.0114 -0.0475*** -0.1305*** -0.1008** -0.0546 
 (0.062) (0.016) (0.035) (0.047) (0.055) 
Change in Unobservables 0.0198 0.0379 0.0415 -0.0450 -0.0887 
Male characteristics§§      
Change in Observable Gender Differentials -0.0628*** -0.0098** -0.0630*** -0.0983*** -0.1357*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Change in Observable Characteristics -0.0358*** -0.0716*** -0.0139*** -0.0330*** 0.0072 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) 
Change in Wage Structure -0.0108 -0.0480*** 0.0571*** -0.0476*** -0.0856*** 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
Change in Unequal Treatment 0.0038 -0.0784** -0.1813*** -0.1263*** -0.0428 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.012) (0.031) (0.044) 
Change in Unobservables 0.0198 0.0845 0.0581 0.1089 0.0635 
 
 
 
Table 4b: Temporal Decomposition of the Gender Pay Gap: Quantile Regression Approach, 1993-1998 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Actual changes in differential -0.1340 -0.1687*** -0.1507*** -0.1897*** -0.1480* 
 (0.088) (0.047) (0.043) (0.059) (0.075) 
Female characteristics¦¦      
Change in Observable Gender Differentials -0.0099 0.0335*** -0.0109 -0.0188*** -0.0832*** 
 (0.035) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.015) 
Change in Observable Characteristics -0.0215 -0.0622*** 0.0156*** 0.0387*** 0.0612** 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.004) (0.007) (0.029) 
Change in Wage Structure -0.0428** -0.0583*** -0.0345*** -0.0649*** -0.0546*** 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) 
Change in Unequal Treatment -0.1034 -0.0901** -0.1158*** -0.0800** -0.0108 
 (0.108) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.058) 
Change in Unobservables 0.0436 0.0085 -0.0051 -0.0647 -0.0607 
Male characteristics§§      
Change in Observable Gender Differentials -0.0620** 0.0351* 0.0445*** 0.0371*** 0.1502*** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.006) (0.009) (0.025) 
Change in Observable Characteristics 0.0306* -0.0639*** -0.0080 -0.0171 -0.0715* 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.039) 
Change in Wage Structure -0.0413** -0.0520*** -0.0217* -0.0565*** -0.1246*** 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) 
Change in Unequal Treatment -0.1050*** -0.0964*** -0.1330*** -0.0884 0.0047 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.044) (0.074) (0.037) 
Change in Unobservables 0.0436 0.0085 -0.0325 -0.0647 -0.1067 
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Table 4c: Temporal Decomposition of the Gender Pay Gap: Quantile Regression Approach,    1998-2002 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Actual changes in differential 0.0482 0.0454* 0.0077 -0.0066 -0.0454 
 (0.041) (0.027) (0.026) (0.049) (0.059) 
Female characteristics¦¦      
Change in Observable Gender Differentials -0.0280*** -0.0551*** -0.0398*** -0.0017 -0.0365*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) 
Change in Observable Characteristics -0.0169** -0.0690*** -0.0141*** 0.0492*** 0.0612*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) 
Change in Wage Structure -0.0049 0.0567*** -0.0219*** -0.0149** -0.0546** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.007) (0.026) 
Change in Unequal Treatment 0.1218* 0.0368* -0.0071 -0.0267** 0.0192 
 (0.062) (0.019) (0.007) (0.013) (0.024) 
Change in Unobservables -0.0238 0.0759 0.0906 -0.0123 -0.0347 
Male characteristics§§      
Change in Observable Gender Differentials -0.0234** -0.0858*** -0.0468*** -0.1347*** -0.2529*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) 
Change in Observable Characteristics -0.0214** -0.0382*** -0.0072** -0.0038 -0.0167** 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
Change in Wage Structure 0.0532*** 0.0450* 0.0180 0.0083 0.0060 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.012) (0.010) (0.022) 
Change in Unequal Treatment 0.0638* 0.0486*** -0.0470 -0.0499 0.0480 
 (0.035) (0.012) (0.099) (0.057) (0.073) 
Change in Unobservables -0.0238 0.0759 0.0906 0.1736 0.1702 
Notes:  
a. ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level of 0.01; 
0.05; and 0.1 respectively;  
b. standard errors are in parentheses; 
c. ¦¦: using expression (14) in the text; 
d. §§: using expression (15) in the text. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variables Variable Description 1993 samples 1998 samples 2002 samples 
  Pooled Male Female Pooled Male Female Pooled Male Female 
Hourly real wage (ln) Hourly wage rate adjusted by CPI and regional price index 0.3920 0.5056 0.2159 0.9372 0.9947 0.8498 1.2093 1.2669 1.1165 
  (0.629) (0.612) (0.616) (0.613) (0.614) (0.603) (0.623) (0.601) (0.644) 
Married = 1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.5427 0.5927 0.4651 0.5606 0.6151 0.4776 0.6154 0.6445 0.5684 
Age Age (years) 30.307 30.589 29.870 32.119 32.660 31.298 32.604 33.091 31.819 
  (10.55) (10.44) (10.71) (10.66) (10.65) (10.63) (10.63) (10.61) (10.61) 
Age squared Age squared (years) 1029.7 1044.6 1006.7 1145.3 1180.1 1092.53 1176.1 1207.68 1125.2 
  (718.5) (720.6) (715.1) (741.1) (753.8) (718.5) (737.3) (743.9) (723.7) 
Illiteracy = 1 if no schooling, 0 otherwise 0.2013 0.1954 0.2105 0.0404 0.0403 0.0406 0.1215 0.1115 0.1378 
Primary education = 1 having primary education, 0 otherwise 0.2688 0.2872 0.2404 0.2181 0.2123 0.2268 0.2284 0.2415 0.2074 
Lower secondary = 1 having lower secondary education, 0 otherwise 0.2342 0.2404 0.2248 0.3521 0.3707 0.3237 0.2400 0.2674 0.1958 
Upper secondary = 1 having upper secondary education, 0 otherwise 0.0926 0.0862 0.1024 0.1977 0.1976 0.1978 0.1282 0.1245 0.1343 
Higher education = 1 having higher education, 0 otherwise 0.2030 0.1908 0.2219 0.1918 0.1791 0.2111 0.2818 0.2552 0.3247 
Health = 1 if having a treatment at hospital over the past 4 week 0.0284 0.0220 0.0384 0.0407 0.0305 0.0563 0.0395 0.0341 0.0482 
Kinh = 1 if belonging in the Kinh majority 0.8929 0.8807 0.9118 0.9018 0.9020 0.9015 0.9389 0.9433 0.9319 
Private = 1 if being employed in the public sector 0.6414 0.6908 0.5647 0.6108 0.6434 0.5613 0.4922 0.5213 0.4453 
Public = 1 if being employed in the private sector 0.3586 0.3092 0.4353 0.3892 0.3566 0.4387 0.3518 0.4787 0.5547 
Urban = 1 if living in urban areas 0.4785 0.4367 0.5434 0.5071 0.4785 0.5505 0.4227 0.4008 0.4579 
Northern Uplands = 1 if residing in Northern Uplands 0.0937 0.0862 0.1053 0.0650 0.0637 0.0671 0.1169 0.1178 0.1154 
Red River Delta = 1 if residing in Red River Delta 0.1907 0.1991 0.1778 0.1754 0.1867 0.1581 0.2328 0.2450 0.2131 
North Central Coast = 1 if residing in North Central Coast 0.0597 0.0642 0.0526 0.0929 0.0969 0.0869 0.0801 0.0882 0.0669 
South Central Coast = 1 if residing in South Central Coast 0.1255 0.1358 0.1095 0.1484 0.1595 0.1316 0.1454 0.1542 0.1312 
Central Highlands = 1 if residing in Central Highlands 0.0106 0.0128 0.0071 0.0164 0.0136 0.0207 0.0815 0.0739 0.0937 
Southeast = 1 if residing in Southeast 0.2632 0.2459 0.2902 0.2995 0.2760 0.3353 0.1180 0.1059 0.1375 
Mekong River Delta = 1 if residing in Mekong River Delta 0.2566 0.2560 0.2575 0.2023 0.2036 0.2003 0.2254 0.2150 0.2422 
Quarter 1 = 1 if interviewed in 1st quarter 0.1573 0.1367 0.1892 0.2624 0.2510 0.2798 0.2436 0.2426 0.2453 
Quarter 2 = 1 if interviewed in 2nd quarter 0.2811 0.2899 0.2674 0.3008 0.2999 0.3022 0.2677 0.2656 0.2711 
Quarter 3 = 1 if interviewed in 3rd quarter 0.2225 0.2358 0.2020 0.2811 0.2858 0.2740 0.2536 0.2506 0.2584 
Quarter 4 = 1 if interviewed in 4th quarter 0.3391 0.3376 0.3414 0.1557 0.1633 0.1440 0.2351 0.2412 0.2252 
Number of Observations  1793 1090 703 3045 1837 1208 17063 10531 6532 
Notes: These are raw figures computed without controlling for any characteristics; standard deviations of continuous variables are reported in parentheses.
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Table A2: Pooled Regression Model, 1993 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Male 0.2774** 0.3125*** 0.3157**** 0.3060*** 0.2990*** 0.2814*** 
 (0.029) (0.048) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.053) 
Married -0.0828** -0.0656 -0.0721 -0.0517 -0.1565*** -0.1327** 
 (0.035) (0.075) (0.056) (0.039) (0.039) (0.061) 
Age 0.0313*** 0.0577*** 0.0330*** 0.0180* 0.0160* 0.0094 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) 
Age squared -0.0004*** -0.0008*** -0.0005*** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary education 0.0200 0.0053 -0.0455 0.0505 0.0518 0.0870 
 (0.044) (0.081) (0.051) (0.043) (0.040) (0.064) 
Lower secondary 0.0279 0.0082 0.0408 0.0972** 0.0417 0.0886 
 (0.048) (0.094) (0.065) (0.042) (0.049) (0.077) 
Upper secondary 0.0694 0.0682 0.0743 0.1244** 0.0745 0.1851* 
 (0.059) (0.112) (0.094) (0.064) (0.080) (0.103) 
Higher education 0.0638 0.1332 0.0972 0.0764 0.0178 0.0709 
 (0.057) (0.107) (0.070) (0.057) (0.073) (0.099) 
Health -0.0588 -0.0767 -0.1175 -0.0169 -0.0613 -0.0422 
 (0.074) (0.180) (0.077) (0.086) (0.085) (0.131) 
Kinh 0.0104 0.0461 0.0934** 0.0245 0.0074 0.0278 
 (0.048) (0.120) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.081) 
Private 0.0742** 0.1214* 0.1038* 0.0102 -0.0065 0.0274 
 (0.039) (0.072) (0.059) (0.040) (0.046) (0.062) 
Urban  0.0471** 0.1341** 0.0280 0.0428** 0.0388 0.0722 
 (0.023) (0.064) (0.042) (0.021) (0.042) (0.055) 
Northern Uplands -0.5818*** -0.6725*** -0.7831*** -0.7297*** -0.4883*** -0.3436*** 
 (0.056) (0.086) (0.077) (0.076) (0.069) (0.131) 
Red River Delta -0.5018*** -0.7225*** -0.5585*** -0.5571*** -0.3774*** -0.3502*** 
 (0.045) (0.087) (0.064) (0.056) (0.060) (0.092) 
North Central Coast -0.4967*** -0.7544*** -0.4770*** -0.4638*** -0.4631*** -0.3646*** 
 (0.064) (0.163) (0.085) (0.073) (0.061) (0.139) 
South Central Coast -0.4569*** -0.5527*** -0.5032*** -0.5421*** -0.4035*** -0.3282*** 
 (0.048) (0.100) (0.064) (0.056) (0.069) (0.085) 
Central Highlands -0.1689* -0.1687 -0.2932** -0.1968 -0.0765 -0.1601 
 (0.095) (0.166) (0.152) (0.180) (0.137) (0.111) 
Mekong River Delta -0.2343*** -0.4082*** -0.2884*** -0.2240*** -0.1287*** -0.1242* 
 (0.042) (0.088) (0.054) (0.043) (0.047) (0.072) 
Interviewed in 1st quarter 0.0353 0.0963 0.0213 0.0976* 0.0036 0.0206 
 (0.043) (0.074) (0.069) (0.054) (0.057) (0.077) 
Interviewed in 2nd quarter 0.0210 0.0305 0.0276 0.0219 0.0200 0.0138 
 (0.035) (0.077) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.062) 
Interviewed in 3rd quarter 0.0249 0.0432 0.0318 0.0258 0.0163 0.0197 
 (0.043) (0.075) (0.056) (0.048) (0.057) (0.072) 
constant -0.2498 -1.3289*** -0.4906** 0.0177 0.2694* 0.6616*** 
 (0.161) (0.343) (0.206) (0.195) (0.152) (0.191) 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.2014 0.1416 0.1491 0.1372 0.1242 0.0868 
Wald  Test (1) ~
2
20c
  39.329*** 44.325*** 54.597*** 45.454*** 25.303 35.270** 
Wald Test  (2) ~
2
21c
  130.09*** 76.657*** 167.10*** 140.18*** 124.36*** 89.243*** 
Number of Observations 1793 1793 1793 1793 1793 1793 
Notes:  
a. ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level 
of 0.01; 0.05; and 0.1 respectively.  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS standard errors are based on Huber (1967) and the quantile 
regression model estimates are based on bootstrapping with 200 replications. 
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c. Wald Tests (1) and (2) are tests for the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients across gender 
groups. Wald Test (1) tests for gender differences in all coefficients excluding the constant term, and Wald 
Test (2) tests for gender differences in all coefficients including the constant term. 
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Table A3: Pooled Regression Model, 1998 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Male 0.1711*** 0.2193*** 0.1823*** 0.1622*** 0.1257*** 0.1446*** 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.046) 
Married -0.0140 -0.0206 -0.0377 -0.0118 0.0268 -0.0234 
 (0.027) (0.055) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.048) 
Age 0.0363*** 0.0494*** 0.0513*** 0.0261*** 0.0081 0.0226** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age squared -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0003** 0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary education 0.0105 -0.0167 0.0179 0.0196 0.0401 0.0542 
 (0.053) (0.083) (0.061) (0.049) (0.047) (0.073) 
Lower secondary 0.0494 0.0042 0.0231 0.0644 0.1239** 0.1386* 
 (0.054) (0.089) (0.063) (0.054) (0.053) (0.076) 
Upper secondary 0.2039*** 0.1486* 0.1331* 0.1930*** 0.2565*** 0.3149*** 
 (0.059) (0.089) (0.074) (0.059) (0.066) (0.095) 
Higher education 0.3868*** 0.2730*** 0.2726*** 0.3702*** 0.4941*** 0.5830*** 
 (0.061) (0.090) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) (0.093) 
Health -0.0202 -0.1380 -0.0930* -0.0066 -0.0396 0.0225 
 (0.051) (0.124) (0.056) (0.055) (0.060) (0.106) 
Kinh  0.0397 0.0145 0.0790* 0.0283 0.0310 0.0248 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.045) (0.040) (0.038) (0.064) 
Private 0.0538** 0.0930** 0.0720** 0.0002 0.0210 0.0466 
 (0.028) (0.043) (0.032) (0.029) (0.034) (0.050) 
Urban 0.1077*** 0.0315 0.0386 0.0746** 0.1062*** 0.1654*** 
 (0.024) (0.042) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.052) 
Northern Uplands -0.3813*** -0.3926*** -0.3731*** -0.3574*** -0.4715*** -0.3137*** 
 (0.042) (0.073) (0.065) (0.044) (0.059) (0.085) 
Red River Delta -0.3893*** -0.5562*** -0.4293*** -0.3707*** -0.3321*** -0.2462*** 
 (0.035) (0.070) (0.045) (0.038) (0.040) (0.063) 
North Central Coast -0.4488*** -0.5409*** -0.4207*** -0.4647*** -0.4531*** -0.3696*** 
 (0.042) (0.071) (0.061) (0.041) (0.055) (0.081) 
South Central Coast -0.3314*** -0.2559*** -0.2886*** -0.3154*** -0.3624*** -0.3824*** 
 (0.030) (0.050) (0.045) (0.039) (0.036) (0.051) 
Central Highlands -0.1754** 0.0213 -0.1117 -0.1416*** -0.3019*** -0.3133** 
 (0.077) (0.230) (0.088) (0.054) (0.068) (0.139) 
Mekong River Delta -0.2462*** -0.2002*** -0.2551*** -0.2371*** -0.2588*** -0.2568*** 
 (0.030) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.053) 
Interviewed in 1st quarter -0.0077 -0.0683 -0.0670 -0.0224 0.0273 0.0342 
 (0.035) (0.065) (0.045) (0.039) (0.038) (0.059) 
Interviewed in 2nd quarter 0.0228 0.0160 -0.0202 0.0142 0.0327 0.0310 
 (0.033) (0.065) (0.042) (0.035) (0.039) (0.051) 
Interviewed in 3rd quarter 0.0049 0.0477 0.0356 0.0176 0.0544 0.0284 
 (0.034) (0.069) (0.042) (0.036) (0.035) (0.051) 
constant 0.1298 -0.5157** 0.3307* 0.3525** 0.7901*** 0.7750*** 
 (0.135) (0.244) (0.177) (0.169) (0.158) (0.202) 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.1798 0.0843 0.0821 0.1044 0.1360 0.1598 
Wald  Test (1) ~
2
20c
  79.045*** 77.126*** 83.535*** 85.725*** 66.812*** 45.534*** 
Wald Test  (2) ~
2
21c
  175.37*** 106.67*** 137.15*** 172.27*** 141.02*** 65.037*** 
Number of Observations 3044 3044 3044 3044 3044 3044 
Notes: see table A2 
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Table A4: Pooled Regression Model, 2002 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Male 0.1783*** 0.2026*** 0.1940*** 0.1643*** 0.1354*** 0.1279*** 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) 
Married -0.0703*** -0.0754*** -0.0780*** -0.0664*** -0.0494*** -0.0756** 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) 
Age 0.0365*** 0.0613*** 0.0417*** 0.0305*** 0.0280*** 0.0201*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Age squared -0.0004*** -0.0008*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary education 0.0782*** 0.1356*** 0.1092*** 0.0800*** 0.0593*** 0.0575*** 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) 
Lower secondary 0.1074*** 0.1645*** 0.1456*** 0.1128*** 0.0911*** 0.0627** 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) 
Upper secondary 0.2882*** 0.2711*** 0.2662*** 0.2655*** 0.2959*** 0.3530*** 
 (0.019) (0.034) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.036) 
Higher education 0.5304*** 0.5043*** 0.5243*** 0.5342*** 0.5547*** 0.5645*** 
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) 
Health -0.0581*** -0.0194 -0.0630** -0.0653*** -0.0607*** 0.0919** 
 (0.023) (0.048) (0.031) (0.026) (0.022) (0.042) 
Kinh  0.0979*** 0.1147** 0.0393* 0.0713*** 0.0730*** 0.1102*** 
 (0.020) (0.047) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.030) 
Private 0.0498*** 0.1328*** 0.0921*** 0.0260** 0.0026 0.0023 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) 
Urban   0.1074*** 0.1025*** 0.1025*** 0.0758*** 0.0970*** 0.1578*** 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
Northern Uplands -0.1621*** -0.1767*** -0.1627*** -0.1914*** -0.1925*** -0.1844*** 
 (0.018) (0.033) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) 
Red River Delta -0.1879*** -0.2222*** -0.1825*** -0.2183*** -0.2088*** -0.1753*** 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) 
North Central Coast -0.2325*** -0.2697*** -0.2434*** -0.2662*** -0.2346*** -0.1708*** 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.041) 
South Central Coast -0.0791*** -0.0683** -0.0447** -0.1086*** -0.1230** -0.1170*** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) 
Central Highlands 0.1761*** 0.0333 0.1441*** 0.1830*** 0.2454*** 0.2988 
 (0.021) (0.038) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) 
Mekong River Delta -0.0632*** -0.1263*** -0.0577*** -0.0870*** -0.0545*** 0.0091 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) 
Interviewed in 1st quarter -0.0367*** -0.0536** -0.0524*** -0.0516*** -0.0282** 0.0137 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.022) 
Interviewed in 2nd quarter 0.0097 0.0110 -0.0108 -0.0037 0.0028 0.0303 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
Interviewed in 3rd quarter 0.0284** 0.0415 0.0413 0.0281 0.0006 0.0311 
 (0.012) (0.039) (0.035) (0.023) (0.013) (0.019) 
constant 0.0378 -0.5012*** -0.3196*** 0.2230*** 0.5552*** 0.8659*** 
 (0.056) (0.103) (0.064) (0.055) (0.064) (0.097) 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.2419 0.0991 0.1157 0.1515 0.1735 0.1724 
Wald  Test (1) ~
2
20c
  101.75*** 84.018*** 145.674*** 95.973*** 60.183*** 35.507** 
Wald Test  (2) ~
2
21c
  550.81*** 246.87*** 430.88*** 402.66*** 311.80*** 169.49*** 
Number of Observations 17063 17063 17063 17063 17063 17063 
Notes: see table A2 
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Table A5: Male and Female Regression Models, 1993 
 MALE SAMPLE FEMALE SAMPLE 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Married -0.1151*** -0.1482* -0.1522** -0.0450 -0.1422** -0.1462** -0.0590 -0.0134 -0.0251 -0.0308 -0.0506 -0.1442 
 (0.052) (0.090) (0.076) (0.055) (0.065) (0.077) (0.051) (0.084) (0.068) (0.057) (0.075) (0.104) 
Age 0.0335*** 0.0748*** 0.0334** 0.0241 0.0110 0.0023 0.0248* 0.0905*** 0.0230 0.0157 0.0305* 0.0122 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.025) 
Age squared -0.0005** -0.0012*** -0.0005** -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003* -0.0012*** -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary education 0.0632 0.0078 -0.0489 0.1065* 0.0738 0.1583* 0.0605 0.0031 -0.0914 -0.0366 0.0007 -0.0364 
 (0.055) (0.124) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.085) (0.068) (0.131) (0.102) (0.073) (0.081) (0.135) 
Lower secondary 0.0305 0.0739 0.0271 0.1129* 0.0517 0.0866 0.0135 0.0079 0.0621 0.0190 0.0440 0.1716 
 (0.060) (0.144) (0.078) (0.062) (0.069) (0.086) (0.078) (0.151) (0.123) (0.070) (0.096) (0.144) 
Upper secondary 0.1109 0.0698 0.0357 0.1221* 0.1539 0.2031* 0.0254 0.0754 0.0642 0.0133 0.0960 0.1175 
 (0.076) (0.176) (0.118) (0.076) (0.111) (0.119) (0.095) (0.158) (0.131) (0.108) (0.120) (0.191) 
Higher education 0.1080 0.0997 0.1282 0.1406* 0.0842 0.0921 0.0113 0.1267 0.1487 0.1891 0.0007 0.0532 
 (0.076) (0.180) (0.097) (0.076) (0.105) (0.120) (0.086) (0.159) (0.128) (0.097) (0.116) (0.144) 
Health -0.0073 -0.0577 0.0925 -0.0082 -0.0846 -0.0559 -0.0632 -0.1134 -0.2051 -0.0772 -0.0069 -0.0231 
 (0.109) (0.270) (0.142) (0.126) (0.165) (0.146) (0.095) (0.193) (0.129) (0.135) (0.136) (0.178) 
Kinh  0.0362 0.0915 -0.0434 -0.0592 0.0195 0.0966 0.1099 0.0859 0.0727 0.1186 0.0326 0.3198** 
 (0.060) (0.154) (0.063) (0.057) (0.066) (0.080) (0.077) (0.131) (0.122) (0.089) (0.134) (0.155) 
Private  0.1925*** 0.2353** 0.2647*** 0.1272** 0.0776 0.0321 -0.1135** -0.0630 -0.1556* -0.1727*** -0.1320* -0.0866 
 (0.054) (0.117) (0.076) (0.050) (0.076) (0.081) (0.053) (0.102) (0.087) (0.058) (0.074) (0.084) 
Urban  0.0811** 0.2322*** 0.0459 0.0558 0.0351 0.0662 0.0052 0.0296 0.1613** 0.0881 0.0776 0.0585 
 (0.043) (0.083) (0.054) (0.046) (0.058) (0.056) (0.052) (0.101) (0.077) (0.062) (0.073) (0.106) 
Northern Uplands -0.5131*** -0.6285*** -0.6857*** -0.6394*** -0.4191*** -0.3788*** -0.6647*** -0.6609*** -0.8629*** -0.7676*** -0.5817*** -0.4728** 
 (0.078) (0.114) (0.114) (0.107) (0.091) (0.141) (0.082) (0.110) (0.101) (0.119) (0.129) (0.223) 
Red River Delta -0.4667*** -0.5914*** -0.4621*** -0.5440*** -0.3857*** -0.3384*** -0.5684*** -0.9104*** -0.7240*** -0.4995*** -0.3981*** -0.2981** 
 (0.059) (0.112) (0.087) (0.068) (0.085) (0.092) (0.073) (0.126) (0.119) (0.102) (0.090) (0.143) 
North Central Coast -0.4728*** -0.4991** -0.4193*** -0.4816*** -0.4663*** -0.5438*** -0.5475*** -0.8386*** -0.5850*** -0.5330*** -0.3845*** -0.4063** 
 (0.085) (0.213) (0.090) (0.089) (0.073) (0.182) (0.099) (0.171) (0.202) (0.139) (0.117) (0.181) 
South Central Coast -0.4565*** -0.6384*** -0.4438*** -0.5298 -0.4311*** -0.3151*** -0.4414*** -0.5845*** -0.4568*** -0.5499*** -0.2910** -0.1093 
 (0.060) (0.128) (0.081) (0.075) (0.084) (0.099) (0.082) (0.170) (0.095) (0.084) (0.133) (0.168) 
Central Highlands -0.0981 0.1353 -0.1930 -0.1659 -0.0853 -0.1919 -0.3484 -0.4069 -0.6225 -0.4162 -0.1104 0.0321 
 (0.095) (0.140) (0.136) (0.163) (0.158) (0.151) (0.229) (0.327) (0.402) (0.398) (0.397) (0.451) 
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 MALE SAMPLE FEMALE SAMPLE 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Mekong River Delta -0.1972*** -0.3842*** -0.2220*** -0.2182*** -0.1236** -0.1125* -0.3016*** -0.4494*** -0.3410*** -0.2743*** -0.1576* -0.1866* 
 (0.054) (0.124) (0.070) (0.058) (0.062) (0.068) (0.066) (0.113) (0.093) (0.066) (0.100) (0.118) 
Interviewed in 1st quarter 0.0319 -0.0667 0.1202 0.0704 0.0271 0.1270* 0.0355 0.0599 0.0775 0.0671 0.0147 -0.1273 
 (0.061) (0.151) (0.103) (0.070) (0.084) (0.075) (0.062) (0.094) (0.093) (0.088) (0.078) (0.135) 
Interviewed in 2nd quarter 0.0231 0.0330 0.0278 0.0197 0.0216 0.0172 0.0151 0.1488 0.0181 0.0192 0.0146 0.0591 
 (0.043) (0.087) (0.056) (0.051) (0.055) (0.065) (0.060) (0.111) (0.091) (0.067) (0.078) (0.113) 
Interviewed in 3rd quarter 0.0215 0.0320 0.0247 0.0215 0.0166 0.0202 0.0333 0.0499 0.0390 0.0310 0.0254 0.0276 
 (0.053) (0.137) (0.079) (0.065) (0.073) (0.086) (0.070) (0.119) (0.100) (0.075) (0.093) (0.138) 
constant -0.2106 -1.4328*** -0.4461* 0.1289 0.5274** 0.8888*** 0.1708 -1.6742*** -0.0597 0.4047 0.2373 1.1259** 
 (0.233) (0.454) (0.276) (0.282) (0.233) (0.249) (0.223) (0.503) (0.329) (0.280) (0.321) (0.444) 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.1643 0.1380 0.1224 0.1134 0.1003 0.0785 0.1877 0.1689 0.1468 0.1321 0.0995 0.0791 
Number of Observations 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090 703 703 703 703 703 703 
Notes:  
a. ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level of 0.01; 0.05; and 0.1 respectively.  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS standard errors are based on Huber (1967) and the quantile regression model estimates are based on bootstrapping with 200 replications 
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Table A6: Male and Female Regression Models, 1998 
 MALE SAMPLE FEMALE SAMPLE 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Married -0.0038 -0.0472 -0.0350 -0.0263 -0.0398 -0.0171 -0.0040 -0.0885 -0.0695 -0.0258 -0.0070 -0.0364 
 (0.037) (0.070) (0.047) (0.038) (0.049) (0.060) (0.038) (0.062) (0.050) (0.043) (0.060) (0.078) 
Age 0.0358*** 0.0695*** 0.0519*** 0.0295*** 0.0093 0.0236* 0.0158 0.0252 0.0265** 0.0170 -0.0078 -0.0132 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) 
Age squared -0.0004*** -0.0010*** -0.0007*** -0.0004** 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary education 0.0195 0.0410 0.0047 0.0041 0.0155 0.0244 0.0985* 0.0180 0.0645 0.0531 0.1465* 0.2985*** 
 (0.069) (0.280) (0.070) (0.071) (0.060) (0.104) (0.062) (0.127) (0.082) (0.085) (0.082) (0.098) 
Lower secondary 0.0320 0.0181 0.0476 0.0212 0.1094 0.1987* 0.1486** 0.0392 0.1080 0.1239 0.1983** 0.2919*** 
 (0.070) (0.277) (0.070) (0.076) (0.075) (0.115) (0.064) (0.115) (0.092) (0.084) (0.079) (0.110) 
Upper secondary 0.1725** 0.1269 0.1512** 0.1570* 0.2162** 0.3003** 0.3017*** 0.1207 0.2077** 0.2713*** 0.4010*** 0.6451*** 
 (0.075) (0.274) (0.076) (0.084) (0.088) (0.126) (0.076) (0.133) (0.100) (0.094) (0.109) (0.131) 
Higher education 0.3563*** 0.2289 0.2917*** 0.2824*** 0.4905*** 0.6043** 0.4709*** 0.3415 0.3853*** 0.4543 0.5681*** 0.8801*** 
 (0.079) (0.287) (0.085) (0.086) (0.098) (0.126) (0.079) (0.135) (0.107) (0.094) (0.102) (0.156) 
Health -0.0285 -0.0298 -0.1264** -0.0941 -0.1032 -0.0415 -0.0036 -0.0640 -0.0444 -0.0783 -0.0408 -0.0012 
 (0.072) (0.163) (0.066) (0.061) (0.093) (0.144) (0.063) (0.155) (0.095) (0.077) (0.079) (0.107) 
Kinh  0.0619 0.0237 0.0418 0.1048** 0.1064** 0.0289 0.0373 0.0199 0.0502 0.0333 0.1299* 0.1667* 
 (0.044) (0.082) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.078) (0.057) (0.077) (0.069) (0.074) (0.071) (0.095) 
Private 0.1902*** 0.2717** 0.2499*** 0.1393*** 0.1044** 0.1746*** -0.1562*** -0.1482** -0.1859*** -0.1513*** -0.1119** -0.0452 
 (0.035) (0.064) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.060) (0.042) (0.063) (0.053) (0.045) (0.053) (0.078) 
Urban  0.1549*** 0.0138 0.0772** 0.1272*** 0.1479*** 0.2645*** 0.0514 0.0031 0.0291 0.0021 0.0118 0.1171* 
 (0.030) (0.050) (0.039) (0.036) (0.040) (0.064) (0.036) (0.062) (0.050) (0.047) (0.052) (0.064) 
Northern Uplands -0.4110*** -0.4037*** -0.4309*** -0.4193*** -0.4953*** -0.3865*** -0.3745*** -0.2948** -0.3914*** -0.3591*** -0.3650*** -0.3858*** 
 (0.056) (0.089) (0.068) (0.077) (0.069) (0.084) (0.063) (0.116) (0.095) (0.064) (0.126) (0.120) 
Red River Delta -0.4076*** -0.5431*** -0.4585*** -0.3674*** -0.3674*** -0.2869*** -0.3730*** -0.5613*** -0.3909*** -0.3331*** -0.3206*** -0.1871 
 (0.043) (0.085) (0.063) (0.047) (0.055) (0.068) (0.059) (0.131) (0.072) (0.073) (0.090) (0.126) 
North Central Coast -0.4884*** -0.6937*** -0.4983*** -0.5224*** -0.4750*** -0.3329*** -0.4254*** -0.4076*** -0.4101*** -0.4183*** -0.5086*** -0.4088** 
 (0.055) (0.096) (0.064) (0.057) (0.063) (0.095) (0.062) (0.108) (0.086) (0.056) (0.091) (0.165) 
South Central Coast -0.3583*** -0.3034*** -0.3106*** -0.3265*** -0.3971*** -0.4139*** -0.3171*** -0.2140*** -0.3033*** -0.3421*** -0.3395*** -0.4031*** 
 (0.039) (0.074) (0.050) (0.045) (0.053) (0.066) (0.047) (0.072) (0.061) (0.062) (0.065) (0.078) 
Central Highlands -0.3901*** -0.4844 -0.1594 -0.2929*** -0.3934*** -0.4279*** -0.0893 0.1639 0.0129 -0.1314* -0.2265** -0.3538*** 
 (0.101) (0.312) (0.158) (0.089) (0.095) (0.114) (0.071) (0.151) (0.098) (0.078) (0.106) (0.127) 
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 MALE SAMPLE FEMALE SAMPLE 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Mekong River Delta -0.2716*** -0.2372*** -0.2480*** -0.2496*** -0.2618*** -0.2853*** -0.2336*** -0.1108* -0.2131*** -0.2541*** -0.3209*** -0.2856*** 
 (0.038) (0.063) (0.049) (0.044) (0.052) (0.072) (0.044) (0.068) (0.061) (0.046) (0.057) (0.081) 
Interviewed in 1st quarter 0.0532 0.1640** 0.0783* 0.0365 0.0618 -0.0057 -0.0037 0.0064 0.0163 -0.0010 -0.0615 -0.0229 
 (0.037) (0.076) (0.048) (0.044) (0.047) (0.065) (0.040) (0.062) (0.057) (0.043) (0.051) (0.079) 
Interviewed in 2nd quarter 0.0157 0.1284 0.0745 0.0544 0.0295 -0.0717 0.0195 -0.0842 -0.0350 0.0831 0.0344 0.1220 
 (0.038) (0.086) (0.051) (0.044) (0.045) (0.068) (0.043) (0.072) (0.061) (0.058) (0.057) (0.079) 
Interviewed in 3rd quarter 0.0223 0.1112 0.0878* 0.0279 -0.0068 -0.0591 -0.0098 -0.0386 -0.0057 0.0067 0.0033 0.0440 
 (0.044) (0.094) (0.052) (0.047) (0.055) (0.079) (0.057) (0.093) (0.067) (0.071) (0.074) (0.099) 
constant 0.2139 -0.8223* -0.3305* 0.3446* 0.9122*** 0.9086*** 0.5369*** -0.0816 0.1315 0.5906*** 1.1966*** 1.2660*** 
 (0.183) (0.428) (0.201) (0.212) (0.219) (0.294) (0.191) (0.371) (0.245) (0.222) (0.283) (0.280) 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.1780 0.1023 0.0857 0.0956 0.1399 0.1669 0.2175 0.1097 0.1003 0.1258 0.1469 0.1932 
Number of Observations 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210 
Notes: see table A5 
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Table A7: Male and Female Regression Models, 2002 
 MALE SAMPLE FEMALE SAMPLE 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Married -0.0555*** -0.0826*** -0.0804*** -0.0551*** -0.0443*** -0.0560* -0.0812*** -0.0625* -0.0688*** -0.0747*** -0.0752*** -0.0936*** 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.031) (0.018) (0.038) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) 
Age 0.0423*** 0.0606*** 0.0467*** 0.0332*** 0.0314*** 0.0238*** 0.0266*** 0.0502*** 0.0305*** 0.0200*** 0.0188*** 0.0186** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Age squared -0.0005*** -0.0008*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0003*** -0.0007*** -0.0003*** -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary education 0.0648*** 0.1146*** 0.0938*** 0.0595*** 0.0485** 0.0532 0.0892*** 0.1425*** 0.0980*** 0.0913*** 0.0926*** 0.0491 
 (0.019) (0.034) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.038) (0.025) (0.050) (0.023) (0.032) (0.027) (0.033) 
Lower secondary 0.0734*** 0.1258*** 0.1109*** 0.0835*** 0.0653*** 0.0237 0.1566*** 0.1912*** 0.1580*** 0.1463*** 0.1573*** 0.1248*** 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.038) (0.027) (0.050) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) 
Upper secondary 0.2319*** 0.1997*** 0.2031*** 0.2022*** 0.2556*** 0.3218*** 0.3742*** 0.3494*** 0.3244*** 0.3472*** 0.3938*** 0.3712*** 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.045) (0.031) (0.060) (0.037) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041) 
Higher education 0.4787*** 0.4469*** 0.4707*** 0.4757*** 0.5140*** 0.5156*** 0.6012*** 0.5363*** 0.5783*** 0.6066*** 0.6280*** 0.6132*** 
 (0.022) (0.035) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.040) (0.029) (0.054) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) 
Health -0.0575** -0.0176 -0.0418 -0.0656* -0.0555** -0.0991* -0.0597* -0.0501 -0.0559 -0.0711** -0.0687* -0.0785 
 (0.030) (0.053) (0.038) (0.039) (0.029) (0.059) (0.035) (0.052) (0.047) (0.033) (0.036) (0.056) 
Kinh  0.1297*** 0.1239** 0.0698*** 0.0950*** 0.1347*** 0.1784*** 0.0550* 0.0503 0.0060 0.0305 0.0039 0.0148 
 (0.026) (0.054) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.039) (0.032) (0.087) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.048) 
Private 0.1052*** 0.1955*** 0.1722*** 0.0731*** 0.0276 0.0348 -0.0161 -0.0172 -0.0216 -0.0089 -0.0255 -0.0550* 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.040) (0.025) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) 
Urban  0.1697*** 0.1561*** 0.1735*** 0.1496*** 0.1543*** 0.2188*** 0.0356** 0.0076 0.0004 0.0057 0.0435** 0.1054*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.043) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026) 
Northern Uplands -0.1783*** -0.1875*** -0.2213*** -0.2336*** -0.1824*** -0.1770*** -0.1385*** -0.0704 -0.1067*** -0.1422*** -0.2289*** -0.2333*** 
 (0.022) (0.034) (0.030) (0.021) (0.028) (0.046) (0.030) (0.059) (0.041) (0.032) (0.030) (0.052) 
Red River Delta -0.1840*** -0.1975*** -0.1965*** -0.2266*** -0.1950*** -0.1680*** -0.2023 -0.2508*** -0.2294*** -0.2266*** -0.2385*** -0.1686*** 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.037) (0.025) (0.058) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036) 
North Central Coast -0.2176*** -0.2427*** -0.2522*** -0.2655*** -0.2003*** -0.1418*** -0.2708*** -0.3127*** -0.2926*** -0.2881*** -0.2847*** -0.2191*** 
 (0.023) (0.039) (0.034) (0.022) (0.030) (0.051) (0.033) (0.078) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.058) 
South Central Coast -0.0756*** -0.0589* -0.0713** -0.1089*** -0.0882*** -0.0866** -0.0927*** -0.0297 -0.0613** -0.1218*** -0.1641*** -0.1297*** 
 (0.019) (0.034) (0.030) (0.021) (0.027) (0.039) (0.025) (0.050) (0.031) (0.023) (0.030) (0.041) 
Central Highlands 0.1504*** 0.0329 0.0964*** 0.1495*** 0.2278*** 0.2726*** 0.2059*** 0.0569 0.1294*** 0.2272*** 0.2661*** 0.3104*** 
 (0.027) (0.043) (0.036) (0.027) (0.033) (0.058) (0.033) (0.078) (0.049) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) 
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 MALE SAMPLE FEMALE SAMPLE 
 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Mekong River Delta -0.0626*** -0.1460*** -0.0838*** -0.0841*** -0.0219 0.0192 -0.0558** -0.0587 -0.0539** -0.1019*** -0.0867*** 0.0244 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.046) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.036) 
Interviewed in 1st quarter -0.0356** -0.0563 -0.0309 -0.0504*** -0.0234 0.0406 -0.0322 -0.0330 -0.0346 -0.0548*** -0.0372 -0.0144 
 (0.015) (0.047) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.020) (0.039) (0.024) (0.020) (0.025) (0.036) 
Interviewed in 2nd quarter 0.0175 0.0200 0.0073 0.0064 0.0146 0.0288 -0.0014 0.0149 -0.0132 -0.0307 -0.0227 0.0265 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.039) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.038) 
Interviewed in 3rd quarter 0.0165 0.0318 0.0252 0.0198 0.0026 0.0104 0.0516 0.0126 0.0440 0.0353 0.0178 0.0477 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.025) (0.040) (0.040) (0.037) (0.028) (0.021) (0.035) 
constant 0.0661 -0.8324*** -0.2588*** 0.3044*** 0.5855*** 0.8873*** 0.2487*** -0.6975*** -0.0207 0.4317*** 0.7600*** 1.0037*** 
 (0.073) (0.135) (0.089) (0.070) (0.084) (0.140) (0.091) (0.177) (0.134) (0.105) (0.102) (0.147) 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.2278 0.0887 0.1024 0.1400 0.1680 0.1662 0.2476 0.0919 0.1212 0.1632 0.1818 0.1820 
Number of Observations 10531 10531 10531 10531 10531 10531 6532 6532 6532 6532 6532 6532 
Notes: see table A5.
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